Abstract:
In the context of decision making under uncertainty, we formalize the concept of analogy: an analogy between two decision problems is a mapping that transforms one problem into the other while preserving the problem's structure. We identify the basic structure of a decision problem, and provide a representation of the mappings that preserve this structure. We then consider decision makers who use multiple analogies. Our main results are a representation theorem for "aggregators" of analogies satisfying certain minimal requirements, and the identification of preferences emerging from analogical reasoning. We show that a large variety of multiple-prior preferences can be thought of as emerging from analogical reasoning.
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Related works: Working Paper: Analogy in Decision-Making (2009) This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.