Optimal Design of Financial Contracts and Moral Hazard

G. Dionne and P. Viala

Cahiers de recherche from Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques

Keywords: CONTRACTS; RISK; ECONOMIC MODELS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: Written 1992
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mtl:montde:9219

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