Equal Factor Equivalence in Economies with Multiple Public Goods

Y. Sprumont

Cahiers de recherche from Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques

Abstract: We consider the problem of provisioon and cost-sharing of multiple public goods. the efficient equal factor equivalent allocation rule makes every agent indifferent between what he receives and the opportunity of choosing the bundle of public goods subject to the constraint of paying r times its cost, where r is set as low as possible.

JEL-codes: H41 H42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: Written 1996

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mtl:montde:9627

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