Noncompetitive Recycling and Market Power

Gérard Gaudet () and Ngo Van Long

Cahiers de recherche from Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques

Abstract: We consider the steady-state equilibrium of an industry characterized by simultaneous decision-making between a produder of a primary good devides on the quality of the virgin product he will produce, and the producer of a perfectly substitutable, but more costly, recycled product, who decides on the fraction of the primary production he will recycle.

JEL-codes: L22 L23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: Written 1999

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Working Paper: Noncompetitive Recycling and Market Power (1999)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mtl:montde:9910

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