Sharing a River

Stefan Ambec () and Y. Sprumont

Cahiers de recherche from Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ

Abstract: A group of agents located along a river have quasi-liner preferences over water and money. We ask how water should be allocated and what money transfers should be performed.

Keywords: COMMON PROPERTY; RESOURCE ALLOCATION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C25 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: Written

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Related works:
Working Paper: Sharing a River (2000)
Working Paper: Sharing a River (2000)
Working Paper: Sharing a River (2000)
Journal Article: Sharing a River (2002)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mtl:montec:2000-08

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