Cooperative VS. Non-cooperative Truels: Little Agreement, but Does that Matter?

Walter Bossert (), Steven J. Brams () and D.M. Kilgour

Cahiers de recherche from Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ

Abstract: In this paper we will describe a class of three-person games and draw general conclusions about non-cooperative behavior in them.

Keywords: GAME THEORY; ECONOMIC MODELS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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Related works:
Journal Article: Cooperative vs non-cooperative truels: little agreement, but does that matter? (2002)
Working Paper: Cooperative vs. Non-Cooperative Truels: Little Agreement, But Does That Matter? (2000)
Working Paper: Cooperative VS. Non-cooperative Truels: Little Agreement, but Does that Matter? (2000)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mtl:montec:2000-15

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