Inflation Targeting Under Asymmetric Preferences

Cahiers de recherche from Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ

Abstract: This paper develops and estimates a game-theoretical model of inflation targeting where the central banker's preferences are asymmetric around the targeted rate.

Keywords: INFLATION; CENTRAL BANKS; GAME THEORY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E58 E32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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Related works:
Working Paper: Inflation Targeting Under Asymmetric Preferences (2001)
Working Paper: Inflation Targeting Under Asymmetric Preferences (2001)
Working Paper: Inflation Targeting Under Asymmetric Preferences (2001)
Journal Article: Inflation Targeting under Asymmetric Preferences (2003)
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