On the Political Economy of Sequential Reforms

Rui Luís de Castro () and Daniele Coen-Pirani ()

Cahiers de recherche from Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ

Abstract: This paper proposes an explanation of why efficient reforms are not carried out when losers have the power to plock their implementation.

Keywords: INTEREST GROUPS; INFORMATION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: Written 2001

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Working Paper: On the Political Economy of Sequential Reforms (2001)
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