On the Political Economy of Sequential Reforms

Ruge-Murcia, F.J.

Cahiers de recherche from Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ

Abstract: This paper studies the proposition that an inflation bias can arise in a setup where a central banker with asymmetric preferences targets the natural unemloyment rate.

Keywords: INFLATION; CENTRAL BANKS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E58 E50 E30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001

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