Probabilistic Assignements of Identical Indivisible Objects and Uniform Probabilistic Rules

Cahiers de recherche from Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ

Abstract: We consider a probabilistic approach to the problem of assigning K indivisible identical objects to a set of agents with single-peaked preferences. Using the ordinal extension of preferences, we characterize the class of uniform probabilistic rules by Pareto efficiency, strategy-proofness, and non-envy.

Keywords: PROBABILITY; ECONOMIC MODELS; PREFERENCES (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D61 D60 C10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: Written 2001

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Working Paper: Probabilistic Assignments of Identical Indivisible Objects and Uniform Probabilistic Rules (2001)
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