Moral Hazard and Marshallian Inefficiency: Evidence from Tunisia

C. Al, Jean-Louis Leslie Arcand () and F. Ethier

Cahiers de recherche from Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ

Abstract: In the presence of moral hazard, received agency theory predicts the "Marshallian inefficiency" of agricultural tenancy contracts, meaning that inputs per hectare on sharecropped land will differ from that on owned land. In this paper, we test for the presence of Marshallian inefficiency using a unique data set collected in the Tunisian village of El Oulja in 1993.

Keywords: MORAL HAZARD; TUNISIA; AGRICULTURE (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D80 Q10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996
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Related works:
Working Paper: Moral Hazard and Marshallian Inefficiency:Evidence from Tunisia (2005)
Working Paper: Moral Hazard and Marshallian Inefficiency: Evidence from Tunisia (1996)
Journal Article: Moral hazard and Marshallian inefficiency: Evidence from Tunisia (2007)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mtl:montec:9605

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