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Blowing the Whistle
Jose Apesteguia Martin Dufwenberg and
Documentos de Trabajo - Lan Gaiak Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra from Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra
Leniency clauses, offering cartelists legal immunity if they blow the whistle on each other, is a recent anti-trust innovation. The authorities wish to thwart cartels and promote competition. This effect is not evident, however; whistle-blowing may enforce trust and collusion by providing a tool for cartelists to punish each other. We examine the impact of leniency law, and other rules, theoretically and experimentally.
Keywords: Anti-trust; leniency; immunity; amnesty; blow the whistle; cartels; price competition; Bertrand model; experiment; communication. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D43 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
Date: 2003, Revised 2003
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Downloads: (external link) ftp://ftp.econ.unavarra.es/pub/DocumentosTrab/DT0303.PDF (application/pdf)
Related works: Journal Article: Blowing the Whistle (2007) Working Paper: Blowing the Whistle (2003) Working Paper: Blowing the Whistle (2003) This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nav:ecupna:0303
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