Persuasion in Politics

Kevin M. Murphy and Andrei Shleifer

No 10248, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We present a model of the creation of social networks, such as political parties, trade unions, religious coalitions, or political action committees, through discussion and mutual persuasion among their members. The key idea is that people are influenced by those inside their network, but not by those outside. Once created, networks can be rented out' to politicians who seek votes and support for their initiatives and ideas, which may have little to do with network members' core beliefs. In this framework, political competition does not lead to convergence of party platforms to the views of the median voter. Rather, parties separate their messages and try to isolate their members to prevent personal influence from those in the opposition.

JEL-codes: D72 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-lam, nep-mic and nep-pol
Date: Written
Note: EFG
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Journal Article: Persuasion in Politics (2004)
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