Political Pressure Deflection

James Anderson () and Maurizio Zanardi ()

No 10439, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Much economic policy is deliberately shifted away from direct political processes to administrative processes --- political pressure deflection. Pressure deflection poses a puzzle to standard political economy models which suggest that having policies to `sell' is valuable to politicians. The puzzle is solved here by showing that incumbents will favor pressure deflection since it can deter viability of a challenger, essentially like entry deterrence. U.S. trade policy since 1934 provides a prime example, especially antidumping law and its evolution.

JEL-codes: D72 F13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
Date: 2004-04
Note: ITI

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Related works:
Working Paper: Political Pressure Deflection (2004)
Working Paper: Political pressure deflection (2004)
Journal Article: Political pressure deflection (2009)
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