A Protectionist Bias in Majoritarian Politics

Gene Grossman () and Elhanan Helpman

No 11014, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We develop a novel model of campaigns, elections, and policymaking in which the ex ante objectives of national party leaders differ from the ex post objectives of elected legislators. This generates a distinction between "policy rhetoric" and "policy reality" and introduces an important role for "party discipline" in the policymaking process. We identify a protectionist bias in majoritarian politics. When trade policy is chosen by the majority delegation and legislators in the minority have limited means to influence choices, the parties announce trade policies that favor specific factors, and the expected tariff or export subsidy is positive. Positions and expected outcomes monotonically approach free trade as party discipline strengthens.

JEL-codes: D72 F13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
Date: 2004-12
Note: ITI POL
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Related works:
Working Paper: A Protectionist Bias in Majoritarian Politics (2005)
Working Paper: A Protectionist Bias in Majoritarian Politics (2004)
Journal Article: A Protectionist Bias in Majoritarian Politics (2005)
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