The Rules of Standard Setting Organizations: An Empirical Analysis

Benjamin Chiao (), Josh Lerner () and Jean Tirole

No 11156, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This paper empirically explores the procedures employed by standard-setting organizations. Consistent with Lerner-Tirole (2004), we find (a) a negative relationship between the extent to which an SSO is oriented to technology sponsors and the concession level required of sponsors and (b) a positive correlation between the sponsor-friendliness of the selected SSO and the quality of the standard. We also develop and test two extensions of the earlier model: the presence of provisions mandating royalty-free licensing is negatively associated with disclosure requirements, and when there are only a limited number of SSOs, the relationship between concessions and user friendliness is weaker.

JEL-codes: L2 O3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-mic
Date: 2005-02
Note: CF PR
View list of references View citations in EconPapers

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w11156.pdf (application/pdf)
Access to the full text is generally limited to series subscribers, however if the top level domain of the client browser is in a developing country or transition economy free access is provided. More information about subscriptions and free access is available at http://www.nber.org/wwphelp.html.

Related works:
Working Paper: The Rules of Standard Setting Organizations: an Empirical Analysis (2006)
Working Paper: The Rules of Standard Setting Organizations: An Empirical Analysis (2007)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11156

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w11156
The price is Paper copy available by mail.

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
Address: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by ().