Corruption, Inequality and Fairness

Alberto Alesina () and George-Marios Angeletos ()

No 11399, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Bigger governments raise the possibilities for corruption; more corruption may in turn raise the support for redistributive policies that intend to correct the inequality and injustice generated by corruption. We formalize these insights in a simple dynamic model. A positive feedback from past to current levels of taxation and corruption arises either when wealth originating in corruption and rent seeking is considered unfair, or when the ability to engage in corruption is unevenly distributed in the population. This feedback introduces persistence in the size of the government and the levels of corruption and inequality. Multiple steady states exist in some cases.

JEL-codes: D31 E62 H2 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dev, nep-mac and nep-pbe
Date: 2005-06
Note: PE POL
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Related works:
Working Paper: Corruption, Inequality and Fairness (2005)
Journal Article: Corruption, inequality, and fairness (2005)
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