Social Value of Public Information: Morris and Shin (2002) Is Actually Pro Transparency, Not Con

Lars E.O. Svensson ()

No 11537, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: The main result of Morris and Shin (2002) (restated in papers by Amato, Morris, and Shin (2002) and Amato and Shin (2003) and commented upon by Economist (2004)) has been presented and interpreted as an anti-transparency result: more public information can be bad. However, some scrutiny of the result shows that it is actually pro transparency: except in very special circumstances, more public information is good. Furthermore, for a conservative benchmark of equal precision in public and private information, social welfare is higher than in a situation without public information.

JEL-codes: D82 D83 E52 E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mac
Date: 2005-08
Note: ME
View list of references

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w11537.pdf (application/pdf)
Access to the full text is generally limited to series subscribers, however if the top level domain of the client browser is in a developing country or transition economy free access is provided. More information about subscriptions and free access is available at http://www.nber.org/wwphelp.html.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11537

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w11537
The price is Paper copy available by mail.

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
Address: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by ().