Religious Extremism: The Good, The Bad, and The Deadly

Eli Berman () and Laurence Iannaccone ()

No 11663, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This paper challenges conventional views of violent religious extremism, particularly those that emphasize militant theology. We offer an alternative analysis that helps explain the persistent demand for religion, the different types of religious that naturally arise, and the special attributes of the %u201Csectarian%u201D type. Sects are adept at producing club goods both spiritual and material. Where governments and economies function poorly, sects often become major suppliers of social services, political action, and coercive force. Their success as providers is much more due to the advantages of their organizational structure than it is to their theology. Religious militancy is most effectively controlled through a combination of policies that raise the direct costs of violence, foster religious competition, improve social services, and encourage private enterprise.

JEL-codes: Z12 H56 H41 K4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cwa, nep-law and nep-soc
Date: Written
Note: LS
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Journal Article: Religious extremism: The good, the bad, and the deadly (2006)
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