Minorities and Storable Votes

Alessandra Casella (), Thomas Palfrey and Raymond G. Riezman

No 11674, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: The paper studies a simple voting system that has the potential to increase the power of minorities without sacrificing aggregate efficiency. Storable votes grant each voter a stock of votes to spend as desidered over a series of binary decisions. By cumulating votes on issues that it deems most important, the minority can win occasionally. But because the majority typically can outvote it, the minority wins only of its strength of preferences is high and the majority's strength of preferences is low. The result is that aggregate efficiency either falls little or in fact rises. The theoretical predictions are confirmed by a series of experiments: the frequency of minority victories, the relative payoff of the minority versus the majority, and the aggregate payoffs all match the theory.

JEL-codes: C9 D7 H1 K19 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-law, nep-pbe and nep-pol
Date: 2005-10
Note: ME PE
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Related works:
Working Paper: Minorities and Storable Votes (2006)
Working Paper: Minorities and storable votes (2006)
Working Paper: Minorities and Storable Votes (2005)
Working Paper: Minorities and Storable Votes (2005)
Working Paper: Minorities and Storable Votes (2005)
Working Paper: Minorities and storable votes (2005)
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