The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing

Simeon Djankov (), Rafael LaPorta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes () and Andrei Shleifer
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Rafael La Porta ()

No 11883, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We present a new measure of legal protection of minority shareholders against expropriation by corporate insiders: the anti-self-dealing index. Assembled with the help of Lex Mundi law firms, the index is calculated for 72 countries based on legal rules prevailing in 2003, and focuses on private enforcement mechanisms, such as disclosure, approval, and litigation, governing a specific self-dealing transaction. This theoretically-grounded index predicts a variety of stock market outcomes, and generally works better than the commonly used index of anti-director rights.

JEL-codes: G3 G38 K22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-fin, nep-law and nep-reg
Date: Written
Note: CF LE
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Journal Article: The law and economics of self-dealing (2008)
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