Financial Globalization, Corporate Governance, and Eastern Europe

René M. Stulz

No 11912, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: For many countries, the most significant barriers to trade in financial assets have been knocked down. Yet, the financial world is not flat because poor governance prevents firms from being widely held and from taking full advantage of financial globalization. Poor governance has implications for corporate finance as well as for macroeconomics. I show that poor governance in Eastern Europe is accompanied, as expected, by high corporate ownership concentration, low firm valuation, poor financial development, and low foreign participation.

JEL-codes: G11 G15 G32 F30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eec, nep-fin, nep-fmk and nep-tra
Date: 2006-01
Note: AP CF
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