Why Does Democracy Need Education?

Edward Ludwig Glaeser (), Giacomo Ponzetto and Andrei Shleifer

No 12128, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Across countries, education and democracy are highly correlated. We motivate empirically and then model a causal mechanism explaining this correlation. In our model, schooling teaches people to interact with others and raises the benefits of civic participation, including voting and organizing. In the battle between democracy and dictatorship, democracy has a wide potential base of support but offers weak incentives to its defenders. Dictatorship provides stronger incentives to a narrower base. As education raises the benefits of civic participation, it raises the support for more democratic regimes relative to dictatorships. This increases the likelihood of democratic revolutions against dictatorships, and reduces that of successful anti-democratic coups.

JEL-codes: D72 D74 H11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-hpe, nep-pbe and nep-pol
Date: 2006-04
Note: EFG LE PE POL
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Journal Article: Why does democracy need education? (2007)
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