Democracy and Protectionism

Kevin H. O'Rourke () and Alan M. Taylor ()

No 12250, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Does democracy encourage free trade? It depends. Broadening the franchise involves transferring power from non-elected elites to the wider population, most of whom will be workers. The Hecksher-Ohlin-Stolper-Samuelson logic says that democratization should lead to more liberal trade policies in countries where workers stand to gain from free trade; and to more protectionist policies in countries where workers will benefit from the imposition of tariffs and quotas. We test and confirm these political economy implications of trade theory hypothesis using data on democracy, factor endowments, and protection in the late nineteenth century.

JEL-codes: F11 F13 N70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hpe and nep-int
Date: 2006-05
Note: DAE ITI
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Working Paper: Democracy and Protectionism (2007)
Working Paper: Democracy and Protectionism (2006)
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