Online Auctions

Axel Ockenfels, David Reiley and Abdolkarim Sadrieh ()

No 12785, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: The economic literature on online auctions is rapidly growing because of the enormous amount of freely available field data. Moreover, numerous innovations in auction-design features on platforms such as eBay have created excellent research opportunities. In this article, we survey the theoretical, empirical, and experimental research on bidder strategies (including the timing of bids and winner's-curse effects) and seller strategies (including reserve-price policies and the use of buy-now options) in online auctions, as well as some of the literature dealing with online-auction design (including stopping rules and multi-object pricing rules).

JEL-codes: D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-mic and nep-mkt
Date: 2006-12
Note: IO
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