Central Bank Transparency: Where, Why, and with What Effects?

N. Nergiz Dincer and Barry Eichengreen ()

No 13003, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Greater transparency in central bank operations is the most dramatic change in the conduct of monetary policy in recent years. In this paper we present new information on its extent and effects. We show that the trend is general: a large number of central banks have moved in the direction of greater transparency since the late 1990s. We then analyze the determinants and effects of central bank transparency in an integrated empirical framework. Transparency is greater in countries with more stable and developed political systems and deeper and more developed financial markets. Our preliminary analysis suggests broadly favorable if relatively weak impacts on inflation and output variability.

JEL-codes: E0 E4 F0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-mac and nep-mon
Date: 2007-03
Note: IFM
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