Factions and Political Competition

Nicola Persico, José Carlos Rodríguez-Pueblita and Dan Silverman

No 13008, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This paper presents a new model of political competition where candidates belong to factions. Before elections, factions compete to direct local public goods to their local constituencies. The model of factional competition delivers a rich set of implications relating the internal organization of the party to the allocation of resources. Several key theoretical predictions of the model find a counterpart in our empirical analysis of newly coded data on the provision of water services in Mexico.

JEL-codes: D72 D73 H4 H54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-pbe and nep-pol
Date: 2007-04
Note: PE POL
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