Women's Liberation: What's in It for Men?

Matthias Doepke () and Michele Tertilt ()

No 13919, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: The nineteenth century witnessed dramatic improvements in the legal rights of married women. Given that these changes took place long before women gained the right to vote, they amounted to a voluntary renouncement of power by men. In this paper, we investigate men's incentives for sharing power with women. In our model, women's legal rights set the marital bargaining power of husbands and wives. We show that men face a tradeoff between the rights they want for their own wives (namely none) and the rights of other women in the economy. Men prefer other men's wives to have rights because men care about their own daughters and because an expansion of women's rights increases educational investments in children. We show that men may agree to relinquish some of their power once technological change increases the importance of human capital. We corroborate our argument with historical evidence on the expansion of women's rights in England and the United States.

JEL-codes: D13 E13 J16 N30 O43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dev, nep-his and nep-lab
Date: 2008-04
Note: DAE ED EFG POL
View citations in EconPapers

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w13919.pdf (application/pdf)
Access to the full text is generally limited to series subscribers, however if the top level domain of the client browser is in a developing country or transition economy free access is provided. More information about subscriptions and free access is available at http://www.nber.org/wwphelp.html.

Related works:
Working Paper: Women’s Liberation: What’s in It for Men? (2008)
Working Paper: Women's Liberation: What's in It for Men? (2008)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:13919

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w13919
The price is Paper copy available by mail.

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
Address: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by ().