Disclosure by Politicians

Simeon Djankov (), Rafael La Porta (), Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes () and Andrei Shleifer

No 14703, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We collect data on the rules and practices of financial and conflict disclosure by politicians in 175 countries. Although two thirds of the countries have some disclosure laws, less than a third make disclosures available to the public. Disclosure is more extensive in richer and more democratic countries. Disclosure is correlated with lower perceived corruption when it is public, when it identifies sources of income and conflicts of interest, and when a country is a democracy.

JEL-codes: H11 K42 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-law, nep-pol and nep-reg
Date: 2009-02
Note: LE POL
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Working Paper: Disclosure by Politicians (2009)
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