Winning Play in Spectrum Auctions

Jeremy Bulow, Jonathan Levin and Paul Milgrom ()

No 14765, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We describe factors that make bidding in large spectrum auctions complex -- including exposure and budget problems, the role of timing within an ascending auction, and the possibilities for price forecasting -- and how economic and game-theoretic analysis can assist bidders in overcoming these problems. We illustrate with the case of the FCC's Advanced Wireless Service auction, in which a new entrant, SpectrumCo, faced all these problems yet managed to purchase nationwide coverage at a discount of roughly a third relative to the prices paid by its incumbent competitors in the same auction, saving more than a billion dollars.

JEL-codes: C72 D44 L21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-gth
Date: 2009-03
Note: IO
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