Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the New York City High School Match

Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Parag Pathak and Alvin Roth ()

No 14864, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: The design of the New York City (NYC) High School match involved tradeoffs among efficiency, stability and strategy-proofness that raise new theoretical questions. We analyze a model with indifferences--ties--in school preferences. Simulations with field data and the theory favor breaking indifferences the same way at every school --single tie breaking-- in a student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism. Any inefficiency associated with a realized tie breaking cannot be removed without harming student incentives. Finally, we empirically document the extent of potential efficiency loss associated with strategy-proofness and stability, and direct attention to some open questions.

JEL-codes: C78 D60 I20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-lab and nep-ure
Date: 2009-04
Note: ED PE
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