Position Auctions with Consumer Search

Susan Athey and Glenn Ellison ()

No 15253, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This paper examines a model in which advertisers bid for "sponsored-link" positions on a search engine. The value advertisers derive from each position is endogenized as coming from sales to a population of consumers who make rational inferences about firm qualities and search optimally. Consumer search strategies, equilibrium bidding, and the welfare benefits of position auctions are analyzed. Implications for reserve prices and a number of other auction design questions are discussed.

JEL-codes: D44 L86 M37 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mkt
Date: 2009-08
Note: IO
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Related works:
Working Paper: Position Auctions with Consumer Search (2007)
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