Bidding for Brains: Intellectual Property Rights and the International Migration of Knowledge Workers

Carol McAusland and Peter Kuhn ()

No 15486, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We introduce international mobility of knowledge workers into a model of Nash equilibrium IPR policy choice among countries. We show that governments have incentives to use IPRs in a bidding war for global talent, resulting in Nash equilibrium IPRs that can be too high, rather than too low, from a global welfare perspective. These incentives become stronger as developing countries grow in size and wealth, thus allowing them to prevent the 'poaching' of their 'brains' by larger, wealthier markets.

JEL-codes: F22 J61 O34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ipr and nep-mig
Date: 2009-11
Note: ITI LS PR

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