Abstract:
The non-existence of credit markets implies that initial income is a determinant of who actually obtains an education. We consider the outcome of a process in which income is taxed to provide subsidies for education. and taxes are chosen by majority voting. We characterize the outcome as a function of both the level and the distribution of income in the economy. In particular we derive conditions under which middle income individuals ally themselves with upper income individuals at the expense of lower income individuals, and vice versa. The analysis determines the relationship between human capital accumulation and distribution of income.
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