Hot Money

Varadarajan Chari () and Patrick J. Kehoe ()

No 6007, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: The conventional wisdom is that capital flows between developing countries and developed countries are more volatile than can be justified by fundamentals. In this paper we construct a simple model in which frictions in international financial markets in combination with standard debt-default problems lead to volatile capital flows. These flows act as tests of fire for borrowing countries. If a country survives this test, its reputation is enhanced and future capital flows become less volatile. Failing this test is associated with a loss of reputation and a decline in the amount of capital flows.

JEL-codes: F0 F3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997-04
Note: IFM
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Working Paper: Hot money (2003)
Working Paper: Hot Money (2003)
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