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"Make Us a King": Anarchy, Predation, and the State

Herschel I. Grossman

No 6289, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: In order to enforce a collective choice to allocate resource to guarding against predators producers must subject themselves to the state's sovereign power to tax and to spend. But these sovereign powers in hand the state can exploit the producers by taxing and spending for its" own purposes. Using a general equilibrium model in which people can choose to be either" producers or predators, this paper rationalizes the biblical request, Make us a king. analysis shows that, if the technology of predation is sufficiently good better for everyone, including both producers and potential predators even though a king maximizes the consumption of a ruling elite.

JEL-codes: D60 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997-11
Note: EFG PE ME
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Journal Article: "Make us a king": anarchy, predation, and the state (2002) Downloads
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