Any Non-Individualistic Social Welfare Function Violates the Pareto Principle

Louis Kaplow () and Steven Shavell ()

No 7051, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: The public at large, many policymakers, and some economists hold views of social welfare that attach some importance to factors other than individuals' utilities. This note shows that any such non-individualistic notion of social welfare conflicts with the Pareto principle.

JEL-codes: D63 H43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-ind and nep-mic
Date: 1999-03
Note: LE PE
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