Capital Mobility, Distributive Conflict, and International Tax Coordination

Dani Rodrik () and Tanguy van Ypersele ()

No 7150, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Basic economic theory identifies a number of efficiency gains that derive from international capital mobility. But just as free trade in goods, there is no guarantee that capital mobility makes everyone better off. Consequently, capital mobility may be politically unsustainable even though it enhances efficiency. This paper discusses how such a dilemma might arise, and suggests that international tax coordination might serve as a way out under some circumstances.

JEL-codes: F21 F42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-pke and nep-pub
Date: 1999-06
Note: IFM ITI PE
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Journal Article: Captial mobility, distributive conflict and international tax coordination (2001)
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