Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation

Rafael La Porta (), Florencio Lopez-deSilanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes ()

No 7403, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We present a model of the effects of legal protection of minority shareholders and of cash flow ownership by a controlling shareholder on the valuation of firms. We then test this model using a sample of 371 large firms from 27 wealthy economies. Consistent with the model, we find evidence of higher valuation of firms in countries with better protection of minority shareholders, and weaker evidence of the benefits of higher cash flow ownership by controlling shareholders for corporate valuation.

JEL-codes: G32 G31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cfn, nep-fin and nep-ind
Date: 1999-10
Note: AP CF
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Related works:
Working Paper: Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation (1999)
Journal Article: Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation (2002)
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