The Choice of Organizational Form in Gasoline Retailing and The Costs of Laws Limiting that Choice

Asher A. Blass () and Dennis W. Carlton ()

No 7435, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This paper uses a new data source to analyze the choice of organizational form of retail gasoline stations. In recent years, gasoline stations have tended to be less likely to be owned and operated by a lessee dealer and more likely to be owned and operated by the refiner. Critics have alleged that company-operated stations are used to drive lessee dealer stations out of business in order to restrict competition. We examine the determinants of organizational form and find them to be based on efficiency not predatory concerns. We estimate the costs of recent laws prohibiting company ownership of gasoline stations.

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Date: 1999-12
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