Government Ownership of Banks

Rafael La Porta (), Florencio Lopezde-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes ()

No 7620, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: In this paper, we investigate a neglected aspect of financial systems of many countries around the world: government ownership of banks. We assemble data which establish four findings. First, government ownership of banks is large and pervasive around the world. Second, such ownership is particularly significant in countries with low levels of per capita income, underdeveloped financial systems, interventionist and inefficient governments, and poor protection of property rights. Third, government ownership of banks is associated with slower subsequent financial development. Finally, government ownership of banks is associated with lower subsequent growth of per capita income, and in particular with lower growth of productivity rather than slower factor accumulation. This evidence is inconsistent with the optimistic development' theories of government ownership of banks common in the 1960s, but supports the more recent political' theories of the effects of government ownership of firms.

JEL-codes: G21 L32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-his, nep-ind and nep-reg
Date: 2000-03
Note: CF PE
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Related works:
Working Paper: Government Ownership of Banks (2000)
Working Paper: Government Ownership of Banks (2001)
Journal Article: Government Ownership of Banks (2002)
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