The Regulation of Entry

Simeon Djankov (), Rafael La Porta (), Florencio LopezdeSilanes and Andrei Shleifer
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes ()

No 7892, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We present new data on the regulation of entry of start-up firms in 75 countries. The data set contains information on the number of procedures, official time, and official cost that a start-up must bear before it can operate legally. The official costs of entry are extremely high in most countries. Countries with heavier regulation of entry have higher corruption and larger unofficial economies, but not better quality of public or private goods. Countries with more democratic and limited governments have fewer entry regulations. The evidence is inconsistent with Pigouvian (helping hand) theories of benevolent regulation, but support the (grabbing hand) view that entry regulation benefits politicians and bureaucrats.

Date: 2000-09
View list of references View citations in EconPapers

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w7892.pdf (application/pdf)
Access to the full text is generally limited to series subscribers, however if the top level domain of the client browser is in a developing country or transition economy free access is provided. More information about subscriptions and free access is available at http://www.nber.org/wwphelp.html.

Related works:
Working Paper: The Regulation of Entry (2000)
Working Paper: The Regulation of Entry (2001)
Working Paper: The regulation of entry (2001)
Working Paper: The Regulation of Entry (2001)
Journal Article: The Regulation Of Entry (2002)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:7892

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w7892
The price is Paper copy available by mail.

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
Address: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by ().