The Optimal Elasticity of Taxable Income

Joel Slemrod () and Wojciech Kopczuk ()

No 7922, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: The strength of the behavioral response to a tax rate change depends on the environment individuals operate in, and may be manipulated by instruments controlled by the government. We first derive a measure of the social benefit to affecting this elasticity. The paper then examines this effect in the solution to the optimal income taxation problem when such an instrument is available, first in a general model and then in an example when the government chooses the income tax base.

JEL-codes: H21 H23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-09
Note: PE
View list of references View citations in EconPapers

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w7922.pdf (application/pdf)
Access to the full text is generally limited to series subscribers, however if the top level domain of the client browser is in a developing country or transition economy free access is provided. More information about subscriptions and free access is available at http://www.nber.org/wwphelp.html.

Related works:
Journal Article: The optimal elasticity of taxable income (2002)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:7922

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w7922
The price is Paper copy available by mail.

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
Address: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by ().