Judicial Checks and Balances

Rafael LaPorta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silane, Christian Pop-Eleches and Andrei Shleifer
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Rafael La Porta () and Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes ()

No 9775, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: In the Anglo-American constitutional tradition, judicial checks and balances are often seen as crucial guarantees of freedom. Hayek (1960) distinguishes two ways in which the judiciary provides such checks and balances: judicial independence and constitutional review. We create a new data base of constitutional rules in 71 countries that reflect these provisions. We find strong support for the proposition that both judicial independence and constitutional review are associated with greater freedom. Consistent with theory, judicial independence accounts for some of the positive effect of common law legal origin on measures of economic freedom. The results point to significant benefits of the Anglo-American system of government for freedom.

JEL-codes: K4 O10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: Judicial Checks and Balances (2004)
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