The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension

László Á. Kóczy () and Luc Lauwers ()

Open Access publications from Katholieke Universiteit Leuven from Katholieke Universiteit Leuven

Abstract: A set of outcomes for a TU-game in characteristic function form is dominant if it is, with respect to an outsider-independent dominance relation, accessible (or admissible)and closed. This outsider-independent dominance relation is restrictive in the sense that a deviating coalition cannot determine the payoffs of those coalitions that are not involved in the deviation. The minimal (for inclusion) dominant set is non-empty and for a game with a non-empty coalition structure core, the minimal dominant set returns this core.

Date: 2002
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Related works:
Journal Article: The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension (2007)
Working Paper: The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension (2004)
Working Paper: The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension (2004)
Working Paper: The Minimal Dominant Set is a Non-Empty Core-Extension (2003)
Journal Article: The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension (2002)
Working Paper: The Minimal Dominant Set is a Non-Empty Core-Extension (2002)
Working Paper: The Minimal Dominant Set is a Non-Empty Core-Extension (2002)
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