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The coalition structure core is accessible

László Á. Kóczy () and Luc Lauwers ()

Open Access publications from Katholieke Universiteit Leuven from Katholieke Universiteit Leuven

Abstract: We prove the existence of an upper bound for the number of blockings required to get from one imputation to another provided that accessibility holds. The bound depends only on the number of players in the TU game considered. For the class of games with non-empty cores this means that the core can be reached via a bounded sequence of blockings. Primitive recursive algorithms are provided to locate accessibility paths.

Keywords: Structure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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Related works:
Journal Article: The coalition structure core is accessible (2004) Downloads
Working Paper: The coalition structure core is accessible (2004) Downloads
Working Paper: The Coalition Structure Core is Accessible (2002) Downloads
Working Paper: The Coalition Structure Core is Accessible (2002) Downloads
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