Intense Network Competition

Johan Stennek () and Thomas TangerŒs ()
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Johan Stennek: Gothenburg University, http://www.stennek.se
Thomas TangerŒs: Research Institute of Industrial Economics, http://www.ifn.se
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Thomas Tangerås ()

No 08-36, Working Papers from NET Institute

Abstract: First, we demonstrate how unregulated price setting in mobile telecommunications may lead to monopolization, even when networks are highly substitutable. Second, we demonstrate that a menu of structural rules, including (i) mandatory interconnection, (ii) reciprocal access prices and (iii) a ban on price discrimination of calls to other networks, may restore competition. This regulation requires neither demand data nor information about call costs.

Keywords: network competition; two-way access; mobile termination rates; network substitutability; entry deterrence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L12 L14 L51 L96 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind, nep-mic and nep-net
Date: 2008-09, Revised 2008-09
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:net:wpaper:0836

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