Bilateral Comparisons and Consistent Fair Division Rules in the Context of Bankruptcy Problems

Nir Dagan () and Oscar Volij
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Oscar Volij: http://volij.co.il

Economic theory and game theory from Nir Dagan

Abstract: We analyze the problem of extending a given bilateral principle of justice to a consistent n-creditor bankruptcy rule. Based on the bilateral principle, we build a family of binary relations on the set of creditors in order to make bilateral comparisons between them. We find that the possibility of extending a specific bilateral principle of justice in a consistent way is closely related to the quasi-transitivity of the binary relations mentioned above.

Date: 1997
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Published in International Journal of Game Theory 26:11-25 (1997)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Bilateral Comparisons and Consistent Fair Division Rules in the Context of Bankruptcy Problems (2002)
Journal Article: Bilateral Comparisons and Consistent Fair Division Rules in the Context of Bankruptcy Problems (1997)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nid:ndagan:004

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