A Noncooperative View of Consistent Bankruptcy Rules

Nir Dagan (), Roberto Serrano () and Oscar Volij
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Oscar Volij: http://volij.co.il

Economic theory and game theory from Nir Dagan

Abstract: We introduce a game form that captures a noncooperative dimention of the consistency property of bankruptcy rules. Any consistent and monotonic rule is fully characterized by a bilateral principle and consistency. Like the consistency axiom, our game form, together with the bilateral principle, yields the corresponding consistent bankruptcy rule as a result of a unique outcome of Nash equilibria. The result holds for a large class of consistent monotone rules, including the Constrained Equal Award, the Proportional Rule, and many other well known rules. Moreover, all the subgame perfect equilibria are coalition-proof in the associated game in strategic form.

JEL-codes: C72 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Date: 1997
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Published in Games and Economic Behavior 18:55-72 (1997)

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Related works:
Working Paper: A Non-Cooperative View of Consistent Bankruptcy Rules (2002)
Journal Article: A Noncooperative View of Consistent Bankruptcy Rules (1997)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nid:ndagan:005

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