Invariance and Randomness in the Nash Program for Coalitional Games

Nir Dagan () and Roberto Serrano ()

Economic theory and game theory from Nir Dagan

Abstract: By introducing physical outcomes in coalitional games we note that coalitional games and social choice problems are equivalent (implying that so are the theory of implementation and the Nash program). This clarifies some misunderstandings (in regrad to invariance and randomness), sometimes found in the Nash program.

Keywords: Nash program; implementation; scale invariance; ordinal invariance; randomness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C71 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Date: 1998
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Published in Economics Letters 58:43-49 (1998)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Invariance and Randomness in the Nash Program for Coalitional Games (1997)
Journal Article: Invariance and randomness in the Nash program for coalitional games (1998)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nid:ndagan:006

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